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  Tax Arbitrage with Risk and E®ort Aversion




Swedish lottery bonds are valuable tax shelters before the tax reform of 1991. By trading
around the coupon lottery, high-tax investors with capital gains from the stock market
shift their tax liability to low-tax investors. The uncertainty of the coupon lottery and
the e®ort of verifying the winning lottery bond numbers are a nuisance to tax traders.
We investigate how the Treasury (issuer), market makers (banks), and lottery bond
investors respond to those frictions.
Keywords: tax arbitrage, coupon lottery, lottery number checking, ex-dividend day,
turn-of-the-year e®ect, rationing, underpricing.
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The paper studies a piece of Swedish ¯nancial history from 1970{1990. In the early 1970s, the
stock market is in deep sleep and the bond market has been shut down since World War II. The
only secondary market for ¯xed-income securities is the lottery bond market. The early 1970s is
also a time period when the Swedish public sector expands rapidly. Tax progressivity is steep and
forces middle-income households to pay marginal tax rates up to 80%. When income taxes cannot
be raised further, payroll taxes are raised from 1% to more than 30% without cap. The e®ects
of taxation are somewhat mitigated by generous o®set provisions including full deductability of
interest and unlimited netting of capital gains and losses.
In this environment, Akelius (1974) explains in a simple way how investors can escape income
tax in the lottery bond market. By trading around the coupon lottery, a high-tax investor can shift
tax liability to a low-tax investor, so that overall tax liability is reduced. Lottery bond turnover
jumps from a few percent per year to above 50% in the 1980s. Tax traders concentrate on sequences
of lottery bonds that cover all order numbers in a series. There are two reasons: a complete bond
sequence earns a portion of the expected coupon payment with certainty, and verifying the winning
bond numbers requires less e®ort. As a result, sequenced bonds trade at a premium above mixed
bonds. The sequenced bond premium peaks at stunningly 25% of par.
Such a conspicuous change in the market place attracts the interest of politicians, who change
the tax law in 1981. Lottery bond prices fall by 25%, trading volume is cut in half, and demand
for new lottery bonds collapses. In an attempt to re-stimulate demand, the Swedish National Debt
O±ce removes all restrictions on the primary lottery bond market (rationing). Coincidentally, a
political agreement that sets out the principles for the tax reform of 1991 is reached at the same
time. Lottery bonds that were issued before 1981 are grandfathered, and tax-motivated trading of
lottery bonds continues until the last old bond matures in 1990.
The paper reads the behavior of market participants into lottery bond prices and trading volume
from the slumber days of 1970 through the publication of Akelius (1974), the tax law change and
the deregulation of the primary market in 1981, to the redemption of the last old bond in 1990.1 Introduction
Swedish lottery bonds are government obligations which make coupon payments by lottery. The
aggregate payment to all lottery bond holders is a ¯xed contractual amount that does not depend
on the state of the economy. Therefore, the uncertain outcome of the coupon lottery is diversi¯able
risk that, according to standard asset pricing theory, should not matter to lottery bond prices.
Contrary to this prediction, Green and Rydqvist (1997) conclude that the marginal lottery bond
investor is risk averse. Their conclusion is also curious from a practical point of view because the
coupon lottery has been constructed to attract investors with lottery preferences. If the marginal
investor is risk averse, then the issuer loses from issuing bonds with coupon payments determined
by lottery.
In a subsequent paper, Green and Rydqvist (1999) show that marginal tax rates can be imputed
from ex-lottery day returns. The tax arbitrage is a simple coupon-capture strategy. A high-tax
investor with a capital gain from the stock market purchases lottery bonds cum-lottery and sells
them at a loss ex-lottery. The capital loss is covered by the tax-free proceeds from the coupon
lottery. A low-tax investor takes the other side of the trade, sells lottery bonds cum-lottery and
buys them back ex-lottery. Through these transactions, the capital gain from the stock market
is transferred from the high-tax investor to the low-tax investor through the lottery bond market,
thus resulting in an overall tax reduction.
At glance, the two previous studies of the Swedish lottery bond market analyze unrelated
economic problems. However, we show in this paper that the two papers are intimately related,
namely that a risk averse tax trader is the marginal lottery bond investor. A simple way to diversify
the uncertainty of the coupon lottery is to form a lottery bond mutual fund and sell mutual fund
shares to lottery bond investors. This strategy works for buy-and-hold investors, and banks do
supply lottery bond mutual funds during the high days of the 1980s (Akelius (1987)). However, a
buy-and-hold mutual fund does not meet the demand of a tax trader, who must coordinate with
other investors with a need to shield tax liability at a particular point of time. Therefore, the
tax trader must cope with the uncertainty of the coupon lottery himself. If the tax trader is the
marginal investor, we expect to ¯nd a risk premium in lottery bond prices.
1Tax-motivated trading of lottery bonds begins on a large scale with the publication of Akelius
(1974), and it ends with the tax reform of 1991. Green and Rydqvist (1997) study the electronically
available time-series from November 1986{1990 that covers a small portion of the high-activity
period. We purchase hard copies of transaction records and backdate the time-series to cover the
entire period from 1970{1990. With the extended data set, we can statistically relate market-based
measures of risk aversion to marginal tax rates to stock market performance. Speci¯cally, a lottery
bond has one series number and one order number. The holder of a complete bond series that covers
all order numbers from 1{1000 earns a portion of the expected coupon with certainty. Risk aversion
can be inferred from the price di®erence between a complete bond sequence and a portfolio of the
equivalent number of bonds out of sequence (Green and Rydqvist (1997)). Marginal tax rates follow
from the observation that lottery bond prices drop by more than the expected coupon payment
over the coupon lottery (Green and Rydqvist (1999)). The correlation between the sequenced bond
premium, the price drop over the coupon lottery, and lagged stock market performance suggests
that the tax trader is the marginal lottery bond investor.
With the extended data set, we also generate other new results. One novel feature is the
behavior of ex-lottery day returns over the course of the calendar year. In the ¯rst quarter, tax
traders are willing to incur capital losses in the amount of 1.9 times the lottery mean while, in
the fourth quarter, the average capital loss is 3.4 times the lottery mean. The marginal tax rate
that can be imputed from those numbers is 46% in the ¯rst quarter and 70% in the fourth quarter.
Clearly, competition for tax shelters increases towards the end of the year. The calendar-time e®ect
in ex-lottery day returns resembles the turn-of-the-year e®ect for small cap stocks (e.g., Keim (1983)
and Reinganum (1983)), and we o®er a real-option explanation.1 A corresponding calendar-time
e®ect in ex-dividend day returns has not been found in the stock market. One explanation is that
abnormal ex-dividend day returns re°ect the transaction costs of market makers (Kalay (1982) and
Boyd and Jagannathan (1994)). Since there is no reason for transaction costs to vary over the
calendar year, ex-dividend day returns do not vary either. In the Swedish lottery bond market,
1There are other examples of increased tax planning towards the end of the ¯scal year. For example, contributions
to individual retirement accounts (IRA) are higher after the end of the income year before the tax return is due on
April 15 (see Feenberg and Skinner (1989)).
2market makers cannot eliminate the negative expected returns over the coupon lottery because short
sales are infeasible (Green and Rydqvist (1999)). In conclusion, the apparent calendar-time e®ect
in the lottery bond market, therefore, supports the transaction-cost interpretation of abnormal
ex-dividend day returns.
A second novel feature stems from market-based evidence of e®ort aversion. Lottery bonds are
bearer securities and investors must manually verify the winning lottery bond numbers. The holder
of an unbroken bond sequence can verify in one shot whether any of the bonds in the sequence
is winning. Consequently, the more broken up the lottery bond portfolio, the more e®ort the
bondholder must put into lottery number checking. Lottery bonds are issued in blocks of unbroken
500-bond sequences and 100-bond sequences. Packages that consist of two 500-bond sequences are
referred to as D-sequences (Roman numeral for 500) and packages of ten 100-bond sequences as
C-sequences (Roman numeral for 100). In matched intra-day comparisons, D-sequence prices are
mostly above or equal to C-sequence prices. The D-premium emerges in the early 1970s and, for
a short period from 1973{1975, it averages 2% of par value. We interpret this price di®erence
as a premium for e®ort aversion because verifying the winning lottery bond numbers of two 500-
bond sequences requires less e®ort than dealing with ten 100-bond sequences. The premium for
D-sequences over C-sequences may appear esoteric to non-lottery-bond scholars, but it provides an
example of the price e®ects of information and how ¯nancial institutions arise to solve information
problems. In Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith tells the story of the Bank of Amsterdam, which
was established in 1609 to verify the intrinsic metal content of some 300 silver coins and 500 gold
coins that circulated in the Netherlands at the time. In the lottery bond market, the D-premium
disappears from 1978{1986 when trading volume shoots up. Like the Bank of Amsterdam, Swedish
banks service investors with lottery number checking when trading volume is large enough to justify
the personnel costs. For a professional lottery number checker, a C-sequence appears to be a perfect
substitute for a D-sequence.2
Third, our paper is a case study of the performance of a regulated ¯nancial market. Before 1981,
supply is rationed and new lottery bonds are underpriced. We estimate that lottery bonds are sold
2The D-premium also resembles the higher commission charged by odd-lot stock brokers.
3in the primary market approximately 6% below the secondary market price. This complements
evidence from numerous studies of initial public o®erings of stocks (see, e.g., Ritter (2003) for a
survey), and the reason may be the same. According to Treasury o±cials, the purpose of rationing
is to disperse bond ownership, which is believed to stabilize demand for future lottery bond issues
(Akelius (1980)).3 In other words, the issuer is willing to incur the cost of rationing in return for
long-term liquidity provision.4 To further disperse bond ownership, the issuer also breaks up bond
sequences into mixed bonds. A price spread between sequenced and mixed bonds in the amount
of 4% of par value emerges from the beginning of the secondary market. This cost is borne by the
issuer. From 1981{1990, when the primary market is allowed to clear, there is no underpricing,
and the sequenced-bond premium does not emerge until several months later. In the deregulated
environment, lottery bond investors pay the full sequenced bond price when they purchase mixed
bonds in the secondary market. The sequenced-bond premium arises when mixed bonds are resold
in the secondary market so, from 1981{1990, the cost of breaking up sequenced bonds into mixed
bonds is borne by the buyers of mixed bonds in the secondary market (Green and Rydqvist (1997)).
Fourth and ¯nally, lottery bonds that used to be widespread in the 1800s have largely disap-
peared from modern ¯nancial markets. The literature on lottery bonds is, therefore, limited to a
few studies of Denmark, pre-revolution Russia, and Sweden.5 Why were lottery bonds issued in
the past? There is a longstanding tension between central governments' desire to control gambling,
and citizens' demand for gambling. In the 1800s, lottery bonds were issued by states and munici-
palities or under state sanction granted to companies such as the Panama Canal Company and the
Suez Canal Company (Levy-Ullman (1896)). Hence, central government's exploited their monopoly
power over gambling to borrow at favorable terms. As state lotteries have become abundant during
the 1900s, the primary reason to bundle a loan (principal) with lottery tickets (coupons) no longer
exists and, as illustrated by the evidence in our paper, those interested in purchasing the princi-
pal and the coupons are not particularly interested in purchasing the lottery tickets. Accordingly,
3The o±cial name is the Swedish National debt O±ce, which we refer to the Treasury for convenience.
4For similar reasons, bidding in US Treasury auctions is restricted to a small set of primary dealers who, in return
for this favor, must promise to purchase securities in future auctions.
5See, respectively, Florentsen and Rydqvist (2002), Ukhov (2005), and elsewhere cited Green and Rydqvist (1997)
and Green and Rydqvist (1999).
4lottery bonds may be condemned to ¯nancial history.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional background
and the data. The tax arbitrage is analyzed in Section 3, and the sequenced bond premium in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Institutional Background & Data
2.1 Swedish Lottery Bonds 1970{1990
The Swedish lottery bond market becomes active during a short period from 1970{1990, when
annual turnover of lottery bonds increases from a few percent per year to above 50% in 1986 before
turnover reverts back to its low historical level after 1990. The interest for trading in lottery bonds
begins with the publication of Akelius (1974), who explains in a simple manner how investors can
take advantage of tax features of lottery bonds to reduce personal income tax. When tax trading
of lottery bonds begins, Swedish ¯nancial markets are inactive. The stock market is in deep sleep
before 1980 when capital controls are loosened and foreign investors are allowed to enter, and the
bond market has been shut down since Wold War II. The lottery bond market is the only secondary
market for ¯xed-income securities before credit controls are removed in the early 1980s and the
regular treasury market is restarted.7
Lottery bonds are non-callable, Swedish government obligations that make coupon payments by
lottery.8 Each bond makes two or three coupon payments per year. Time to maturity from issuance
varies between ¯ve and ten years, so over its life time, a lottery bond conducts between 10 and
30 coupon lotteries. The principal is paid back to investors at maturity. Lottery bonds are bearer
securities. They are designed for the retail market and issued in small denominations of 50, 100, and
6While lottery bonds have largely ceased to exist, governments in some countries supply savings accounts with
interest determined by lottery, e.g., Argentina, Denmark, France, and United Kingdom (Lobe and HÄ olzl (2008)).
Bonds with redemption lottery, e.g., corporate bonds with sinking fund provision, continue to be issued. Studies of
redemption lottery bonds include Schilbred (1973) and BÄ uhler and Herzog (2008).
7During the regulation period, the discount rate of the Central bank is the only interest-rate time-series against
which to compare lottery bond coupon rates and yields. The discount rate does not respond to short-term changes
in market conditions.
8All lottery bonds issued from 1942{1955 with 20 years to maturity or no pre-set time to maturity are callable
after ten years.
5200 kronor.9 Recent lottery bonds have par values 1,000 and 10,000 kronor. Between one and three
loans are issued each year. We refer to each bond by issue year and loan number. For example, bond
1974:2 denotes the second loan of the bond issued in 1974. From 1970{1990, the outstanding loan
stock averages 9% of Swedish Government debt and 3.5% of Gross Domestic Product. Institutional
information about the lottery bond market is taken from the Annual Yearbook of the Swedish
National Debt O±ce 1920{1984, issue prospectuses for the various loans, and the two editions of
Akelius (1974) and Akelius (1980).
2.2 Coupon Lottery
Each bond within a lottery bond issue has a series number and an order number. The structure of
the coupon lottery of 1974:2 is shown in Table 1. There are 4,000 series with 1,000 order numbers
within each series, so the number of bonds outstanding is four million. The coupon lottery pays
3,090 prizes between 400 kronor and 320,000 kronor. These prizes are randomized across all bonds
without replacement. Each such prize is awarded by drawing one series number and one order
number. The lottery also pays 80,000 small prizes in the amount of 50 kronor each. The small
prizes are randomized across the 1000 order numbers in each series. Since there are 4,000 series and
80,000 small prizes, a total of 20 small prizes are distributed among the 1000 order numbers of each
series. The holder of a complete bond sequence with all order numbers 1{1000 is certain to win the
20 small prizes of 50 kronor. We refer to this feature as the partial guarantee. For this bond, the
annualized certain return from the small payments is 2% of par, and the annualized expected return
from the coupon lottery is 5.15%. The guaranteed portion to the holder of a complete 1000-bond
sequence is 38.83% (the ratio of 2% and 5.15%). The par value of a 1000-bond sequence is 100,000
kronor.
The dual structure of the coupon lottery with series numbers and order numbers has its roots in
the technology to generate and distribute the winning lottery bond numbers. The payments of the
3,090 large prizes between 400 kronor and 320,000 kronor require that the issuer generates 3,090
9Purchasing power has decreased by approximately eight times since 1975 and the exchange rate between the
krona and the dollar has varied around eight kronor to the dollar, so we can think of the purchasing power of 100
kronor in 1975 as 100 dollars in 2010.
6Table 1: Coupon Lottery of Bond 1974:2
Prize Number Probability Expectation Variance
(kronor) (kronor) (kronor)
320,000 2 0.0000005 0.160 51,199
80,000 8 0.0000020 0.160 12,799
40,000 12 0.0000030 0.120 4,799
20,000 28 0.0000070 0.140 2,799
8,000 150 0.0000375 0.300 2,398
4,000 350 0.0000875 0.350 1,398
800 900 0.0002250 0.180 143
400 1,640 0.0004100 0.164 65
50 80,000 0.0200000 1.000 45
0 3,916,910 0.9792275 0.000 6
Sum: 4,000,000 1.0000000 2.575 75,653
The table shows the structure of the semi-annual coupon lottery for bond 1974:2. Prizes are quoted net of 20%
lottery tax.
series numbers and 3,090 order numbers, while the payments of the 80,000 small prizes require only
20 order numbers that are equal across all series. Before 1963, the winning numbers are generated
manually by drawing numbered balls from two cylinders, one for series numbers and one for order
numbers. Generating the numbers could last more than one day (Akelius (1980)). From 1963,
the winning lottery bond numbers are computer generated and the marginal cost of generating
additional numbers is zero. However, distributing a large set of winning numbers is costly. The
winning numbers are printed in a pamphlet and mailed to bondholders. From 1982, banks also
receive the list of winning numbers on °oppy disk. The list of the winning numbers of the 3,090
large prizes are put into a table that covers four pages (approximately letter size). The list of the
20 order numbers that identify the winners of the small prizes are put in a separate table at the end
of the pamphlet. Distributing 80,000 small prizes with only 20 order numbers reduces the costs of
generating, printing, and mailing. With expanding issue volume and increasing number of prizes,
the two smallest prizes of lottery bonds 1975{1978 and the three smallest prizes of lottery bonds
1979{1980 are distributed by drawing order numbers only.
7From 1981{1990, a bond sequence with the partial guarantee is reduced to 100. To illustrate
the new procedure, suppose there are 20 small prizes as in Table 1 above. Two order numbers
a;b 2 [1;100] are generated. The small prizes are paid to owners of lottery bonds with order
numbers:
a;b;100 + a;100 + b;200 + a;200 + b;¢ ¢ ¢ ¢ ¢;900 + a;900 + b:
Accordingly, the owner of a 100-bond sequences earns two of the 20 small prizes with certainty.
Finally, to reduce handling costs, a portion of lottery bonds 1984{1987 is pre-packaged into 100-
bond sequences, i.e., one ownership certi¯cate represents a complete 100-bond sequence.
2.3 Primary Market
Lottery bonds are sold through a ¯xed-price o®er. Before the general sales begin, holders of
maturing bonds can convert old bonds into new bonds at par.10 The average take-up ratio is 82%.
Old bondholders also have an option to purchase one new bond for each old bond at par.11 This
option is exercised by 68% of old bondholders. From 1970{1980, on average, 23% of the lottery
bond issue is placed with old bondholders, 9% is sold to registered lottery bond consortia, and 68%
is sold to the general public.12
A time line around the redemption of an old bond and the °otation of a new bond is shown
in Figure 1. After the ¯nal coupon lottery, old bondholders can convert maturing bonds into new
bonds during a two-week conversion period. Secondary market trading stops after the conversion
period, but the old bond remains listed until non-converted bonds have been redeemed. An o®er
prospectus with the terms of the new bond is presented to the market shortly before the conversion
10The conversion option means that lottery bonds are °oating rate securities with the interest rate being reset
every ¯ve or ten years. From 1986, maturing bonds are redeemed for cash. Green and Rydqvist (1999) study the
behavior of lottery bond yields after the change of redemption policy.
11When 50-kronor bonds are converted into 100-kronor bonds, the bondholder can choose to pay for one new bond
with two 50-kronor bonds or one 50-kronor bond plus 50 kronor cash. The same principle applies to the conversion of
100-kronor bonds into 200-kronor bonds. When 50-kronor bonds are converted into 200-kronor bonds, the bondholder
chooses between paying with four 50-kronor bonds and one 50-kronor bond plus 150 kronor cash.
12A lottery bond consortium must have a minimum number of members, it must register with the Treasury and
express in writing that it intends to become a long-term bondholder. In return for these restrictions, lottery bond
consortia can ¯nance the lottery bond purchase with a loan from the Central Bank, they can order by mail, and they
can purchase sequenced bonds (more below). From 1968:2{1980, on average, 500 lottery bond consortia purchase
lottery bonds in each new o®ering.
8period. The o®er prospectus speci¯es the par value, coupon rate, lottery structure, redemption year,
and the approximate number of lotteries over the new bond's life time. Shortly before the general
sales, the o®er price is determined. Most bonds issued in 1970{1980 are sold at a premium above
par. The average o®er premium is 1.9% and the range of the o®er premium is 0{4%. The Treasury
sells 6% of the new bonds directly. Banks sell the remaining bonds on commission (best-e®ort






















Figure 1: Time Line around Redemption and Flotation: The upper vector represents the time line
for a maturing bond, and the lower vector the time line for a new bond. On average, four months elapse from
the ¯nal lottery to redemption, and two months from the issuance of the o®er prospectus to the opening of
the secondary market.
From 1963{1980, the Treasury rations supply. The objective of rationing is to disperse own-
ership, which the Treasury believes stabilizes long-term demand. Akelius (1980) reports from
conversations with Treasury o±cials that the Treasury aims at holding back supply by 10-15%
below anticipated demand. In direct sales by the Treasury to the general public, the Treasury
o®ers a small number of bonds per buyer. The initial quota is 25 or 50 bonds per buyer, but the
quota is often reduced during the ¯rst day of sales. Akelius (1980) describes how investors line up
in person over night for the opportunity to buy new bonds the next day. It is not known how the
banks allocate the new bonds among its customers, but we conjecture that banks favor their best
customers as they tend to do in initial public o®erings of stocks. Rationing ends in 1981.
13In the 1950s, new lottery bond issues were partly underwritten.

























































































The ¯gure shows the time-series of the conversion premium in percent of par. The
conversion premium is estimated as the average market price of mixed and sequenced
bonds over par.
E®ective rationing requires that lottery bonds are underpriced. Underpricing can be estimated
as the market price of old bonds over par during the conversion period. The time-series of the
conversion premium is shown in Figure 2. From 1970{1980, the conversion option is in the money
most of the time. The average conversion premium is 8% and the range is -0.1% to 24.3%. Since the
average conversion premium exceeds the average o®er premium in the general sales, we conclude
that the new bonds are underpriced. After rationing is abandoned, the conversion premium is
near zero. Rationing is temporarily reinstated for the two lottery bond issues in 1987, which are
reserved for the holders of maturing bonds 1977:1{3 and 1982:1{3. The average conversion premium
for those two bonds is 12%.
From 1963{1980, the Treasury also pursues a mixed-bond policy. Fresh out of prints, lottery
bonds come in ordered sequences. However, the Treasury breaks up all lottery bond series into
sequences of 100 bonds and disperses 100-bond sequences among the banks. The best a bank
can do to replicate a complete 1000-bond sequence is to combine 100-bond sequences from ten
di®erent series into a broken 1000-bond sequence that covers all order numbers from 1{1000. This
package is named a C-sequence. It is an example of a ¯nancial innovation in response to regulation.
10From 1967{1976:1, the Treasury makes an exception for holders of complete 1000-bond sequences
of maturing bonds. These are labeled S-sequences.14 Old bondholders can convert each old S-
sequence into two 500-bond sequences that cover all order numbers from 1{500 and 501{1000. This
package is referred to as a D-sequence.15 From 1968:2{1976:1, lottery bond consortia can also
purchase unbroken 500-bond sequences and D-sequences under certain conditions.16 From 1976:2{
1980, the mixed-bond policy is tightened. Unbroken 500-bond sequences and D-sequences are not
issued because many lottery bond consortia that have agreed to become long-term bondholders sell
their bonds shortly after the secondary market opens (bond °ipping). Henceforth, lottery bond
consortia must purchase C-sequences, and maturing D-sequences are converted into C-sequences.
The mixed-bond policy also ends in 1981.
Table 2: Standard Bond Sequences of 1974:2
Sequence Series numbers Order numbers
50 1 1{50, 51{100, 101{150, ¢ ¢ ¢, 951{1000
100 1 1{100, 101{200, 201{300, ¢ ¢ ¢, 901{1000
500 1 1{500, 501{1000
1000 C 10 1{1000
1000 D 2 1{1000
1000 S 1 1{1000
A standard bond sequence has one series number and the range of order numbers indicated in the table. A
C-sequence is composed of 10 sequences of 100 bonds from di®erent series, a D-sequence of two sequences of
500 bonds from di®erent series, and a S-sequence of one sequence of 1000 bonds. All other combinations are
referred to as mixed bonds.
As a result of Treasury policy, lottery bonds trade in many forms. Table 2 lists standard bond
sequences of 1974:2. A standard bond sequence must have the same series number and a speci¯c
range of order numbers. A complete 1000-bond sequence that covers all order numbers from 1-1000
14New S-sequences are not issued from 1963 after a conspicuous price spread has emerged between S-sequences
and mixed bonds for bond 1961. S-sequences rarely trade except for this bond where 25% of the loan amount are
S-sequences. According to a Treasury o±cial, S-sequences are abolished because the Treasury ¯nds it inequitable
that only wealthy households can purchase the higher valued package.
15The par amount of old S-sequences converted into new D-sequences averages to 5% of the new par amount. The
range of this statistic across lottery bond issues is 1{17%.
16A lottery bond consortium with ten members can purchase unbroken 100-bond sequences. If the number of
members is 15, the consortium can purchase 500-bond sequences, and a consortium of 20 members with no single
member owning more than 10% can purchase D-sequences.
11can consist of ten 100-bond sequences with di®erent series numbers (C-sequence), two 500-bond
sequences with di®erent series numbers (D-sequence), or one 1000-bond sequence with the same
series number (S-sequence).17 Bondholders can also construct non-standard combinations such as
twenty 50-bond sequences that cover all order numbers from 1{1000, but this combination is treated
as a portfolio of 50-bond sequences in transactions with other investors.
2.4 Taxation
Lottery bonds generate tax liability from coupon income and capital gains. Coupon income is tax
exempt, while capital gains are taxed as personal income. Short-term capital gains are fully taxed,
while long-term capital gains are partly or entirely exempt.18 The taxpayer can o®set capital losses
on lottery bonds against capital gains on stocks, real estate, and various other assets, but excess
capital losses must not o®set other income. The loss deduction must be used the same income year.
From 1977, capital losses can be carried forward six years. Brokerage costs and interest expense
associated with holding lottery bonds are fully deductible against personal income.19 Deductions
are valuable because marginal tax rates are high. In 1974, the marginal tax rate is 52% at an
annual income of 30,000 kronor. The top marginal tax rate of 78% kicks in at 150,000 kronor.
These numbers can be compared to the cost of purchasing a 1000-bond sequence in the amount of
100,000{200,000 kronor.
The o®set rules change in 1981. The new rules stipulate that capital losses on lottery bonds
can only o®set capital gains on lottery bonds. Outstanding lottery bonds are grandfathered one
year, and capital losses on old bonds continue to o®set capital gains on publicly-traded stocks,
but capital losses can no longer be deducted from capital gains on closely-held stocks, real estate,
and other assets. The tax law passes the Parliament in October 1980. One year later, after a
political agreement that sets out the principles for the tax reform of 1991, the grandfather clause
17S-sequences of 1974:2 are not issued in the primary market and must, therefore, be constructed in the secondary
market by pairing two 500-bond sequences from the same series.
18From 1970{1990, 100% of the capital gain is taxable income if the holding period is 0{2 years, 75% if 2{3 years,
50% if 3{4 years, 25% if 4{5 years, and 0% if the holding period exceeds ¯ve years.
19A simple tax arbitrage that we do not study further in this paper is to lever up a buy-and-hold portfolio of lottery
bonds. At a high enough marginal tax rate, the after-tax interest expense equals the guaranteed interest income from
ownership of a complete bond sequence. In addition, the lottery bond investor participates in the coupon lottery for
the non-guaranteed prizes.
















New tax law 
The ¯gure plots the average daily market price over par for C-sequences of old bonds
(issued before 1981). The new tax law stipulates that capital losses on lottery bonds can
only o®set capital gains on lottery bonds.
is made permanent.20 This means that losses on old bonds continue to o®set capital gains on
publicly-traded stocks until 1990 when the last old bond matures.
The tax law change has a dramatic impact on the lottery bond market. Figure 3 plots the
average lottery bond price for C-sequences in percent of par value. The tax law change is marked.
Lottery bond prices fall by 25%, trading volume is cut in half, and demand for new lottery bonds
collapses. The Treasury responds with a number of changes to re-stimulate demand. (i) Supply is
cut back from 4,300 million kronor in 1980 to only 600 million kronor in 1981. (ii) The coupon rate
is raised from 6.48% to 7.40%. Since borrowing costs are higher, time to maturity is reduced from
ten to ¯ve years. (iii) Rationing and the mixed-bond policy are abandoned. Henceforth, investors
can purchase any number of bonds in sequence they want, lottery bonds are not underpriced
(Figure 2), and new lottery bond consortia are not formed. (iv) The par value of a guarantee
sequence is reduced from 200,000 kronor to 20,000 kronor to make the partial guarantee a®ordable
to a broader investor population (see Section 2.2 above).
20In 1991, the marginal tax rate on capital losses on lottery bonds is reduced to 21%. This change largely removes
the incentive to generate capital losses in the lottery bond market (see Green and Rydqvist (1999)).
132.5 Secondary Market & Data
Lottery bonds are traded on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. From 1970{1980, mixed bonds are
traded in a call auction in the morning. The Stockholm Stock Exchange publishes four prices
from the call auction: the highest uncleared buy limit order, the lowest uncleared sell limit order,
the highest transaction price, and the lowest transaction price. Trading continues on the °oor
throughout the day. Both mixed and sequenced bonds are traded in the aftermarket. For mixed
bonds, the Stockholm Stock Exchange records the daily high, low, and last transaction prices from
the after-market. For sequenced bonds, the daily high and low transaction prices are stored. The
aggregate transaction volume throughout the day is also published. The publications are archived
by the National Library of Sweden. The price and volume information is typed on large paper
format (A3) with plenty of space between rows and columns. We purchase hard copies and scan
the data. In the analysis below, average daily transaction prices are used.
From 1981{1990, data reporting increases multifold.21 Data are printed electronically on small
paper format (A4) with little space between rows and columns. It is not suitable for scanning, and
the magnetic tape that was used to print the hard copies has disappeared. For mixed and sequenced
bonds, we collect manually the best buy limit order at the end of the day and the number of bonds
traded during the day. From November 1986, a subset of the data are stored electronically by
Findata. These data are used by Green and Rydqvist (1997). We merge the manually collected
time-series with the corresponding numbers from Findata.
Table 3 lists standard bond sequences of bonds traded in 1970{1990. Henceforth, we highlight
the di®erence between old and new bonds by putting them into separate panels. Boldface marks
a bond sequence with the partial guarantee. For bonds issued before 1960, the partial guarantee
requires ownership of bonds with order numbers 1{2000.22 For bonds issued from 1960{1980, the
small prizes are distributed across order numbers 1{1000 (C-, D-, or S-sequence). For new bonds,
21For mixed bonds and each bond sequence, the publications contain the best buy and sell limit orders from open
and from close (four prices). In addition, for mixed bonds and each bond sequence, low and high transaction prices
from the call auction are reported along with high, low, and last transaction prices from the aftermarket (¯ve prices).
Finally, for mixed bonds and each bond sequence, the number of bonds traded is recorded.
22A 2000-bond sequence consists of 2000 bonds with the same series number (S-sequence) or two sequences of 1000
bonds with di®erent series numbers (M-sequence).
14Table 3: Traded Bond Sequences 1970{1990
Standard bond sequence
A. Old bonds
1951{1954 Mix 50 100 500 1,000 2,000 M 2,000 S
1960{1976:1 Mix 50 100 500 1,000 C 1,000 D 1,000 S
1976:2{1980 Mix 50 100 1,000 C
B. New bonds
1981{1987 Mix 50 100 500 1,000 C 1,000 M
1986:1 Mix
1988{1989:1 Mix 50 100
1989:2{1990 Mix 50 100
The table lists traded bond sequences. Boldface means that the sequence is entitled to the partial guarantee.
For 50-kronor bonds, a M-sequence consists of two 1000-bond sequences and a S-sequence of one 2000-bond
sequence. For old 100-kronor and 200-kronor bonds, a C-sequence is composed of 10 sequences of 100 bonds, a
D-sequence of two 500-bond sequences, and a S-sequence of one 1000-bond sequence. For new 200-kronor bonds,
a M-sequence consists of one 1000-bond sequence.
ownership of a 100-bond sequence is entitled to the partial guarantee.23 A complete 1000-bond
sequence is labeled M-sequence (the Roman numeral for one thousand).
Most lottery bond issues within the same year are very similar as they have the same coupon
rate, coupon payment dates, and maturity date. To eliminate this almost perfect dependency across
bonds and to ¯ll in gaps in the time-series, we compute the equally weighted average price across
the two or three bond issues within the same year and use the average price for the statistical
analysis.24
23Bond 1986:1 does not have a guarantee and the three bonds 1988{1989:1 require ownership of a complete 1000-
bond sequence. The latter 1000-bond sequences are not traded because they are too expensive for most investors
(one million kronor).
24Some years, the second and third lottery bond issue has an initial lottery that is not synchronized with the
lotteries of the ¯rst bond issue of the year. Then, we delete the price series before the initial lottery. Averaging is
not used for the two lottery bond issues in 1964 and the two or three lottery bond issues in 1983:3{1986:2 for which
the coupon payment dates are not synchronized.
152.6 Trading Volume
Table 4 reports the percent of business days with transaction volume (¯rst row) and annualized
turnover in percent of the number of bonds outstanding (second row).25 Due to data limitations,
turnover is measured from 1981{1990. Starting with the trading of old bonds (Panel A), we see
that mixed bonds and short bond sequences are traded more frequently than long bond sequences
(¯rst row), but that turnover is concentrated to C-sequences (second row). Trading of 500-bond
sequences, D-sequences, and S-sequences is sparse as a result of the Treasury's mixed-bond policy.26
Trading of new bonds (Panel B)is similar except that M-sequences trade regularly (¯rst row).
Turnover of new bonds is evenly spread out and not concentrated to any particular bond sequence
(second row). We see furthermore in Figure 4, that trading of C-sequences of old bonds increases
Table 4: Trading Volume
Period Mix 50 100 500 1,000 1,000 1,000
C D S/M
A. Old bonds
Days with trade 1970{90 78.2 68.2 81.2 5.8 56.3 21.4 0.6
Turnover 1981{90 2.8 1.9 5.0 0.2 31.6 1.6 0.0
B. New bonds
Days with trade 1970{90 73.0 79.4 95.9 27.5 41.8 n/a 55.4
Turnover 1981{90 0.7 0.8 3.9 0.5 5.9 n/a 7.8
The ¯rst row of each panel shows the percent of business days with transaction volume measured over
1970{1990. The second row reports annualized turnover in percent of bonds outstanding in 1981{1990. A
C-sequence is composed of 10 sequences of 100 bonds, a D-sequence of two sequences of 500 bonds, and a
S/M-sequence of one sequence of 1000 bonds.
over time. Hence, lottery bond turnover increases as banks put together additional C-sequences of
old bonds.
The aggregate trading volume data do not reveal average trade size (except when there is no
25Statistics on trading volume are based on individual lottery bond series. Due to space limitations, we omit the
few transactions of 1000- and 2000-bond sequences of 1951{1955. There are 12 transactions of 1000-bond sequences,
zero transactions of M-sequences, and 66 transactions of S-sequences.
26New 500-bond sequences cannot be constructed in the secondary market. Some D-sequences arise from combining
500-bond sequences in the secondary market and, occasionally, S-sequences are formed when lottery bond consortia
exchange matching 500-bond sequences with each other. The entire data set contains 231 transactions of S-sequences.
In 53 instances, the S-sequences originate from the secondary market.

















The ¯gure plots the percent of business days in a year with transaction volume for old
bonds. A C-sequence is composed of 10 sequences of 100 bonds, and a D-sequence of two
sequences of 500 bonds.
transaction or only one transaction during the day), but there are good reasons to believe that
mixed bonds trade in packages. About 75% of the days with transaction volume, aggregate trading
volume of mixed bonds is a multiple of 50 bonds. This clustering of trade sizes suggests that bond
dealers package and sell mixed bonds as \round trading lots". Many mixed-bond packages are
large. The aggregate daily volume of mixed bonds exceeds 1000 bonds about 20% of the time.
3 Tax Arbitrage
Lottery bond prices are quoted with accrued interest. This means that lottery bond prices, on
average, decrease over the coupon lottery. A simple tax arbitrage means that a high-tax investor
with a capital gain from the stock market purchases lottery bonds cum-lottery and sells them at
a loss ex-lottery. The high-tax investor covers his loss with the tax-free proceeds from the coupon
lottery. A low-tax investor takes the other side of the trade, sells lottery bonds cum-lottery and
buys them back ex-lottery. In this way, the capital gain from the stock market is shifted from the
high-tax investor to the low-tax investor in the lottery bond market. The implications from these
17transactions for ex-day returns, lottery bond yields, and trading volume are studied by Green and
Rydqvist (1999). Here, we extend the time-series. The calendar-time e®ect is a new result.
Table 5: Drop-O® Ratios and Marginal Tax Rates
Mix 50 100 500 1,000 1,000 1,000
C D M
A. Old bonds
Drop-o® ratio 1.88 2.34 2.63 3.08 2.92 3.10 n/a
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.15) (0.10) (0.13)
Marginal tax rate (%) 46.7 57.4 62.0 67.5 65.8 67.8 n/a
(1.9) (1.3) (1.2) (1.6) (1.1) (1.4)
B. New bonds
Drop-o® ratio 1.09 1.22 1.33 1.16 1.38 n/a 1.35
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.12)
Marginal tax rate (%) 8.6 18.3 24.6 13.7 27.6 n/a 25.7
(6.8) (5.5) (4.5) (8.5) (4.5) (6.6)
The table reports average drop-o® ratios and marginal tax rates using Equation (2). Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses below. The standard errors of the marginal tax rates are computed with the delta method.
The estimation is based on 365 lottery days in Panel A and 159 lottery days in Panel B.
Denote the last price cum-lottery with Pc and the ¯rst price ex-lottery with Pe. The marginal
tax rate is ¿ and the lottery mean E(C). We ignore transaction costs and discounting. A risk-
neutral investor breaks even when his capital loss after tax equals the expected proceeds from the
coupon lottery:
(Pe ¡ Pc)(1 ¡ ¿) + E(C) = 0: (1)
We solve for the marginal tax rate:






The term within brackets on the right hand side is the price drop scaled by the lottery mean. This
variable, often referred to as the drop-o® ratio, is the dependent variable in the literature on the
ex-dividend day (see Elton and Gruber (1970)).
Table 5 reports average drop-o® ratios and imputed marginal tax rates for mixed and sequenced
bonds. On average, the drop-o® ratio exceeds one, which means that pre-tax capital losses exceed































The ¯gure plots top statutory tax rates along with imputed marginal tax rates from
prices of C-sequences using Equation (2).
the lottery mean. Drop-o® ratios for old bonds exceed those of new bonds, but drop-o® ratios
exceed one also for new bonds. Drop-o® ratios for longer bond sequences exceed those of shorter
bond sequences and mixed bonds. In Panel A, (old bonds), the average drop-o® ratio for mixed
bonds is about two times the lottery mean compared to that for 1000-bond sequences (C- and
D-sequences), which is approximately three times the lottery mean. Marginal tax rates for old
bonds are quite high and range from 46.7% for mixed bonds to 67.8% for D-sequences. Marginal
tax rates for new bonds are less and range from 8.6% for mixed bonds to 27.6% for C-sequences.
Figure 5 displays the time-series of top statutory tax rates (solid line) along with marginal tax
rates of old bonds (¯lled diamonds) and new bonds (open diamonds) imputed from C-sequences.
Marginal tax rates of old bonds fall below top statutory rates, they increase with statutory rates
in the 1970s, and the decrease in the 1980s. We also see that marginal tax rates of new bonds fall
below those of old bonds.
While there are many reasons why marginal tax rates can fall below top statutory rates, we
¯rst consider a real-option explanation derived from the apparent calendar-time e®ect reported in
Table 6. The table reports drop-o® ratios and marginal tax rates of C-sequences by quarter. In the
19Table 6: Calendar-Time E®ect
Quarter
First Second Third Fourth F-test
A. Old bonds
Drop-o® ratio 1.86 2.81 3.51 3.35 16.22
(0.11) (0.15) (0.21) (0.21) (0.000)
Marginal tax rate (%) 46.4 64.4 71.5 70.2
(3.3) (1.9) (1.7) (1.8)
B. New bonds
Drop-o® ratio 1.09 1.25 1.40 1.80 3.34
(0.10) (0.14) (0.22) (0.17) (0.021)
Marginal tax rate (%) 8.4 20.1 28.7 44.4
(8.7) (9.1) (11.3) (5.2)
The table reports average drop-o® ratios and imputed marginal tax rates for C-sequences by quarter. Robust
standard errors are reported below in parentheses. The standard errors of the marginal tax rates are computed
with the delta method. The F-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the means are equal across quarters. P-values
are reported below. The estimation is based on 365 lottery days in Panel A and 159 lottery days in Panel B.
¯rst quarter, investors pay less than two times the lottery mean compared to the last quarter when
investors pay more than three times the lottery mean (Panel A). Accordingly, imputed marginal
tax rates increase from less than 50% in the ¯rst quarter to 70% in the last quarter. This evidence
suggests that competition for tax shelters increases over the calendar year. There is a calendar-time
e®ect also for new bonds (Panel B). Marginal tax rates increase from 11.2% in the ¯rst quarter to
42.1% in the last quarter. Generating a capital loss in the lottery bond market is a real option,
which expires at the time of the last coupon lottery in December. In the beginning of the year
when real option value is high, investors are reluctant to generate capital losses in the lottery bond
market. The situation is di®erent in December, when real option value is low. Uncertainty about
stock market performance has been resolved, and generating a capital loss in the lottery bond
market may be one of the few remaining options to escape capital gains tax. On average, during
the course of the year, the real option is valuable and, as a consequence, imputed marginal tax
rates fall below top statutory tax rates.
Among other reasons why imputed marginal tax rates fall below top statutory rates, we notice
the following: First, the marginal investor may not be in the top income bracket. The fact that
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The ¯gure shows annualized daily turnover of old bonds around the lottery in percent of the number
of bonds outstanding. Day 0 is the ¯rst day ex-lottery.
marginal tax rates from new bonds fall below those of old bonds certainly means that the marginal
investor for new bonds is not in the top income bracket. Presumably, low-tax investors who supply
old bonds cum-lottery shield tax liability on capital gains from old bonds with capital losses from
new bonds. Second, the model ignores transaction costs and, third, it assumes risk neutrality.
Given the multitude of possible explanations, we do not attempt to calibrate a real-option model,
a transaction-costs model, or a risk-averse utility function to the observed di®erence between top
statutory and imputed marginal tax rates.
The calendar-time e®ect is also visible in the trading volume data. Figure 6 displays annualized
average daily turnover around the coupon lottery in percent of the number of bonds outstanding.
Turnover of old bonds increases around the lottery, in particular in the fourth quarter. The spike
on the ¯rst day ex-lottery is indicative of pre-arranged, forward trading.
4 Sequenced Bond Premium
Sequenced bonds trade at a premium above mixed bonds. The price comparison between D- and
C-sequences is new.
















The ¯gure plots the time-series of the daily average price di®erence between C-sequences
and mixed bonds for old bonds in percent of par.
4.1 Univariate Analysis
Sequenced bonds are generally worth more than mixed bonds. Figure 7 plots the average daily
price di®erence between C-sequences and mixed bonds of old bonds. The sequenced bond premium
is small in the beginning of the time-series. The premium subsequently increases and peaks above
25% of par value in 1976. The premium decreases by approximately 10 percentage points or by
two thirds in response to the tax law change. Afterwards, the premium oscillates between ¯ve and
ten percent of par value until the last old bond matures in 1990. The time-series variation re°ects
the supply of C-sequenced bonds that can be inferred from Figure 4 above. In 1970, C-sequences
barely exist and do not trade much. As the sequenced bond premium increases, banks increase
supply of C-sequences by putting together 100-bond sequences. The peak in the sequenced bond
premium in 1976 occurs after Akelius (1974) has become well known, but before banks have been
able to meet demand.
The sequenced bond premium for C-sequences transmits to corresponding premia for all bond
sequences. Table 7 reports average price di®erences between sequenced bonds and mixed bonds
of old bonds (top row) and new bonds (bottom row). We notice the following general patterns:
22Table 7: Market Value of Sequenced over Mixed Bonds
50 100 500 1,000 1,000 1,000
C D M
Old bonds 2.21 4.02 4.40 5.48 5.45 n/a
New bonds 1.27 1.80 1.90 2.01 n/a 2.47
The table reports the average price di®erence between sequenced and mixed bonds in percent of par. A C-sequence
is composed of 10 sequences of 100 bonds, a D-sequence of two sequences of 500 bonds, and a M-sequence of one
sequence of 1000 bonds.
(i) Sequenced bonds generally command a premium above mixed bonds. (ii) Sequenced bond
premia of old bonds are larger than sequenced bond premia of new bonds.27 (iii) Longer sequences
of old bonds are worth more than shorter bond sequences, while longer sequences of new bonds
are worth approximately the same as shorter bond sequences.28 (iv) Controlling for the partial
guarantee (old bonds: C and D; new bonds: 100, 500, C, and M), the sequenced bond premium is
approximately equal.
The average premia of old D- and C-sequences over mixed bonds mask important time-series
variation. Figure 8 plots the average daily price di®erence between D- and C-sequences. The D-
premium begins near zero, it averages above two percent from 1973{1975, and it reverts back to
near zero from 1978{1986. Prices converge when lottery bond turnover increases from previously
less than 10% per year to between 25% and 50% per year. In fact, prices of all long bond sequences
(100, 500, C, and D) converge from 1978{1990.
The handling cost advantage of a D-sequence is a natural explanation for the price di®erence
between D- and C-sequences. Manual veri¯cation of the winning lottery bond numbers of a large
lottery bond portfolio can be a non-trivial task. The bondholder must check the numbers of the
lottery bonds in his portfolio against the list of winning lottery bond numbers in the pamphlet.
The winning lottery bond numbers are sorted by series number and order number. A letter code
adjacent to each number pair indicates the prize. Lottery number checking of a complete S-sequence
27We omit standard errors from the table, but we are con¯dent that the averages are statistically di®erent from
zero. More than 90% of the observations for old bonds and 60% for new bonds are positive.
28The few observations of S-sequenced bonds have been omitted from the table. They are concentrated to 1970
when the sequenced bond premium is small. In paired transactions, S-sequences always command a premium above
shorter bond sequences and mixed bonds.















The ¯gure plots the time-series of the daily average price di®erence between D-sequences
and C-sequences of old bonds.
is relatively easy because the bondholder is done after checking only one series number. The holder
of a D-sequence must check two series numbers, while the holder of a C-sequence must work
through the table ten times. If one series number matches, the lottery bond investor must also
check the order numbers. The e®ort required to checking a portfolio of 1000 mixed bonds depends
on the composition of the mixed-bond portfolio. Banks begin using computers for lottery number
checking in 1982. Computers raise accuracy and reduce the risk that a prize is not claimed, but
banks must continue to register lottery bond numbers manually. To allow banks to register lottery
bond numbers, trade is suspended about two weeks around the coupon lottery. Electronic lottery
number checking reduces handling costs for buy-and-hold investors, but it may not do much good
for a tax trader who purchases the bond right before the coupon lottery and sells it back afterwards.
The disappearance of the D-premium from 1978{1986, when trading volume shoots up, suggests
that there are economies of scale in lottery number checking. The continued price spread between
sequenced and mixed bonds from 1978{1990 may re°ect a remaining handling cost advantage of
sequenced over mixed bonds, however.
244.2 Multivariate Analysis
We use multivariate regression analysis to establish a statistical link between the sequenced bond
premium and ex-lottery day returns. The dependent variable is the premium for C-sequences over
mixed bonds in percent of par value. Three variables, GAIN, TIME, and CUM, proxy for the price
e®ects of tax arbitrage around the coupon lottery. A central variable in Green and Rydqvist (1997),
the guaranteed portion of the expected coupon, is omitted because it is approximately equal to
40% across old bonds.
GAIN is a proxy variable for capital gains tax liability from the stock market. It is measured
as lagged stock price growth computed from end-of-month stock market index values over the
previous twelve months. We expect that the sequenced bond premium increases with lagged stock
price growth because better stock market performance should raise demand for tax shelters. Lagged
stock price growth averages about 1% per year in the 1970s and 10% per year in the 1980s.
TIME measures calendar time from the last lottery of the previous calendar year to the last
lottery of the current year. We use separate time counts for old and new bonds. After scaling by
365 days in a year, TIME increases linearly from from zero to one. The calendar-time e®ect in
drop-o® ratios in Table 6 suggests that the sequenced bond premium peaks in December.





1 ¡ tcum=120; if N ¸ 1 remaining lotteries,
0; if N = 0 remaining lotteries,
(3)
where tcum measures the number of business days remaining to the next lottery. CUM is uniformly
distributed from zero right after the previous lottery to one right before the next lottery. We
expect that sequenced bonds are most valuable right before the coupon lottery when uncertainty is
resolved. The anticipated regression coe±cient can be inferred from Table 5 above where drop-o®
ratios of sequenced bonds exceed those of mixed bonds.
25POST74 is a dummy variable which equals one from 1975{1990 and zero otherwise. It captures
the impact of Akelius (1974). Its e®ect on the sequenced bond premium is apparent from Figure 7.
TAX81 is a dummy variable which equals one from mid October 1980 to mid October 1981.
This is the approximate time between the initial tax law change and the ¯nal tax law change. The
expected, negative e®ect of this variable on the sequenced bond premium is also apparent from
Figure 7.
PACK is the proportion of a lottery bond issue that is pre-packaged into 100-bond sequences
(see Section 2.2 above). The variable is zero except for new bonds issued in 1984{1987, for which
it ranges from 0.25 to 0.78. The variable captures a negative liquidity e®ect on the sequenced bond
premium. Pre-packaged bonds cannot be broken up and sold as mixed bonds. Excess supply of
bond sequences can sometimes depress sequenced bond prices below those of mixed bonds (Green
and Rydqvist (1997)).
BEG0{BEG2 and END2{END0 are dummy variables. BEG0{BEG2 equal one when zero,
one, or two lotteries has elapsed. Similarly, END2{END0 are dummy variables which equal one
Table 8: Seasoning and Maturity
#Elapsed lotteries #Remaining lotteries
0 +1 +2 {2 {1 0
Old bonds 4.38 3.78 3.37 4.67 2.36 0.07
New bonds 0.68 1.83 1.44 2.01 1.19 {0.04
The table reports the average premium for C-sequences over mixed bonds in percent of par shortly after seasoning
and near maturity.
when there is two, one, or zero remaining lotteries. The seasoning and maturity e®ects can be
seen in Table 8. First, we see in the left section that old C-sequences trade at a premium from
the beginning of the secondary market, while the price di®erence between new C-sequences and
mixed bonds is small. The di®erent seasoning e®ect of old versus new bonds is a new result.
Next, we see in the right section that the premium for both old and new C-sequences decreases
26towards maturity and vanishes after the ¯nal lottery. This pattern suggests that the sequenced
bond premium is related to the coupon lottery and not to a liquidity di®erence between sequenced
and mixed bonds. Once the uncertainty of the coupon lottery has been resolved, sequenced and
mixed bonds are perfect substitutes (Green and Rydqvist (1997)).
Table 9: Determinants of the Sequenced Bond Premium for Old Bonds
Intercept GAIN TIME CUM END2 END1 END0 POST74 TAX81 R
2
A. 1970{1990
2.17 1.89 0.27 3.12 {1.32 {2.06 {1.47 1.54 {0.60 0.169
(6.5) (3.5) (3.9) (59.5) ({7.0) ({8.2) ({4.7) (4.8) (-4.0)
B. 1982{1990
4.20 4.14 0.09 2.67 {2.05 {3.45 {3.17 n/a n/a 0.189
(25.7) (7.3) (0.9) (34.0) ({11.8) ({17.1) ({12.3)
The table reports the results of regressing the sequenced-bond premium on explanatory variables. The dependent
variable is the price di®erence between C-sequences and mixed bonds in percent of par. GAIN is one-year lagged
stock price growth. TIME2 [0;1] measures time from the last lottery of the previous year. CUM2 [0;1]
measures time to next lottery. END2, END1, and END0 are dummy variables that capture the number of
remaining lotteries. POST74 is a dummy variable which is one from 1975{1990 and zero otherwise. TAX81 is
a dummy variable which is one from mid-October 1980 to mid-October 1981. The standard errors are adjusted
for ¯rst-order autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the POOL command from Shazam. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses below the coe±cients. There are 14 cross-sections with a total of 21,662 observations in
Panel A, and nine cross-sections with 9,534 observations in Panel B.
We estimate a panel regression with 14 cross-sections of old bonds and 12 new bonds. The error
term is adjusted for ¯rst-order autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the POOL command
in Shazam. The regression results for old bonds are reported in Table 9. Using the entire data set
(Panel A), the coe±cients of the three central variables GAIN, TIME, and CUM are positive and
statistically di®erent from zero. The coe±cients mean that a 100% run-up in stock prices raises the
sequenced bond premium by two percentage points, that the sequenced bond premium increases
over the calendar year by 0.3 percentage points, and that the sequenced bond premium increases
between lotteries by about three percentage points. These regression results link the sequenced
bond premium to stock market performance (GAIN), to the calendar-time e®ect of ex-day returns
(TIME), and to the coupon lottery (CUM). The correlation between the sequenced bond premium
and stock market performance (GAIN) is stronger in the recent data (Panel B). This is also the
27case for the calendar-time e®ect (TIME), which is not statistically di®erent from zero in the recent
data (Panel B). The coe±cients of END2{END0 capture the maturity e®ect, and the coe±cients
of POST74 and TAX81 the time-series e®ects of Akelius (1974) and the tax law change in 1981,
respectively.
Table 10: Determinants of the Sequenced Bond Premium for New Bonds
Intercept GAIN TIME CUM END2 END1 END0 BEG0 BEG1 BEG2 PACK R
2
1.86 5.74 0.08 1.33 {0.50 {0.33 {0.33 0.17 0.42 {0.25 {0.47 0.045
(9.9) (9.9) (0.8) (14.8) ({2.6) ({1.3) ({0.9) (0.5) (1.8) ({1.3) ({12.1)
The table reports the results of regressing the sequenced-bond premium on explanatory variables. The dependent
variable is the price di®erence between C-sequences and mixed bonds in percent of par. GAIN is one-year
lagged stock price growth. TIME2 [0;1] measures time from the last lottery of the previous year. CUM2 [0;1]
measures time to next lottery. END2, END1, and END0 are dummy variables that capture the number of
remaining lotteries, and BEG0, BEG1, and BEG2 are dummy variables for the initial lotteries. PACK2 [0;1]
is the proportion of the lottery bond issues 1984{1987 that is pre-packaged into 100-bond sequences. The
standard errors are adjusted for ¯rst-order autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the POOL command
from Shazam. t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coe±cients. There are 12 cross-sections with a
total of 12,370 observations.
The regression results for the new bonds in Table 10 are qualitatively similar. The correlation
between the sequenced bond premium and stock market performance (GAIN) is similar for new
and old bonds (Table 9, Panel B). The calendar-time e®ect as captured by TIME is not statistically
di®erent from zero for either new nor old bonds (Table 9, Panel B). The seasoning e®ect is apparent
in the negative coe±cients of BEG0{BEG2. The liquidity e®ect of pre-packaged 100-bond sequences
(PACK) is apparent.
5 Conclusions
Undoubtedly, demand for Swedish lottery bonds 1970{1990 is tax driven. The tax law change in
1981 and the market response to the tax law change are prima facie evidence. The time-series
behavior of imputed marginal tax rates, the calendar-time e®ect in drop-o® ratios, and trading
volume around the coupon lottery also lead to this conclusion.
Sequenced bonds are worth more than mixed bonds. Several observations suggest that the
sequenced bond premium is determined by the tax-motivated trading around the coupon lottery.
28The regression model summarizes the supporting evidence: the sequenced bond premium increases
with lagged stock price growth, it increases between lotteries, it increases over the calendar year,
it increases after Akelius (1974), and it drops after the tax law change in 1981. In addition, the
sequenced bond premium of new bonds with limited tax deductibility is much smaller. Sequenced
bonds o®er two advantages over mixed bonds: a portion of the expected coupon payment is guaran-
teed and lottery number checking requires less e®ort. For these reasons, the short-term tax trader
prefers sequenced over mixed bonds.
When the tax bene¯ts of old lottery bonds disappear with the redemption of the last old bond
in 1990, one would expect the price di®erence between sequenced and mixed bonds to disappear.
However, the sequences of some lottery bonds with a large portion of the expected coupon guaran-
teed (about 80%) continue to trade at prices well above mixed bonds, while the sequences of other
lottery bonds with a smaller portion of the expected coupon guaranteed (around 40%) trade at
small premia above mixed bonds. Since these price e®ects are unrelated to tax planning, we leave
this asset pricing problem for future research.
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